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I. INTRODUCTION
A new force seems to be at work in public health law and practice.
Consider, for example, the proliferation of references to ‘preparedness’;
speciﬁcally, ‘public health emergency preparedness’ and its more
specialised variants such as ‘public health emergency legal preparedness’
and ‘international legal preparedness’. There is also increasing use of
related phrases such as ‘global public health security’ and ‘international
health security’. Of course, a proliferation of terms is not enough to
prove that a new force is in play: language shifts all the time in all
sorts of areas, and although such changes may reﬂect and contribute
to deep social transformation, they can also be nothing more than
passing fashions with little or no impact. But public health emergency
preparedness does not feel like a superﬁcial, short-lived trend: in fact,
it seems almost the exact opposite. Indeed, as David Fidler and Laurence
Gostin emphasise in their recent book, Biosecurity in the Global Age,a
‘policy revolution’ seems to have taken place – a revolution brought
about by a ‘collision’ of public health and security.
1
The collision of security and public health is our focus in this article.
But before explaining why, we need to deﬁne ‘public health emergency
preparedness’, in particular its impressive–sounding correlate, ‘global
public health security’, and its less readily comprehensible subset,
‘public health emergency legal preparedness’. In the World Health
Report 2007, Dr Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health
Organization (WHO), described ‘global public health security’ as ‘the
reduced vulnerability of populations to acute threats to health’.
2 Later
in the same report, more detailed deﬁnitions were provided:
1 DP Fidler and LO Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons,
Public Health, and the Rule of Law (Stanford Law and Politics 2007) 145.
2 WHO, The World Health Report 2007: A Safer Future: Global Public Health
Security in the 21st Century (WHO 2007) vii.
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Global public health security widens this deﬁnition to include
acute public health events that endanger the collective health of
populations living across geographical regions and international
boundaries ....[G]lobal health security, or lack of it, may also
have an impact on economic or political stability, trade, tourism,
access to goods and services and, if they occur repeatedly, on demo-
graphic stability.
3
The other term that requires some explanation is ‘public health emer-
gency legal preparedness’. Stated shortly, this is all about having the
right laws in place and then using them in the right way in a time of
public health emergency.
4 In other words, it is about both legal prepa-
redness for, and response to, public health emergencies – it is both
proactive and reactive. More generally, it can be said to be an essential
part of both public and global public health security, and a subset of
public health emergency preparedness.
Having identiﬁed these basics, we move to the purpose of this article.
The aim is to present a human rights lawyer’s perspective on both public
health emergency preparedness and, more generally, the turn towards
securing public health through securitisation. We develop this perspec-
tive by asking the following question: is human rights prepared for
public health emergency preparedness? We are not conﬁdent that it is.
In what follows, we explain why we take this view and we also sketch
out a preliminary agenda designed to encourage greater human rights
preparedness. We focus in particular on the importance of thinking
through how risk and its relationship to rights is being framed, and
also how this relationship ought to be framed.
II. SECURITY AND HEALTH ‘THROUGH A NEW LENS’
One response to public health emergency preparedness might go as
follows: even if there is an abundance of new terms, there is nothing
new about the link between health and security. The detailed version
3 Ibid.,a t1 .
4 See B Kamoie and others, ‘Assessing Laws and Legal Authorities for Public
Health Emergency Legal Preparedness’ (2008) 36 Journal of Law, Medicine
& Ethics 23, deﬁning it as ‘attainment of legal benchmarks within a public
health system’ and identifying its four ‘core elements’ as: effective legal auth-
orities; competency in their use; co-ordination of their implementation across
sectors and jurisdictions; and information to guide their design etc. See, also,
AD Moulton and others, ‘What Is Public Health Legal Preparedness? (2003)
31 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 372.
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the effect of disease on military strength and preparedness is, without
doubt, an age-old concern. Infectious diseases can also be a source of
indirect harm to national security given their potential to cause ‘political
and economic damage in countries in which a state has vital security,
foreign policy, and trade interests’.
5 Turning next to economic security,
it is clear that here too there is a longstanding link to health. The ﬁrst
International Health Regulations (1969) and their predecessors, the
International Sanitary Regulations (1951), were explicit about this
link: they aimed to ‘ensure the maximum security against the inter-
national spread of diseases with a minimum interference with world
trafﬁc’.
6 Finally, a third, more general, link between health and security
arises from the fact that infectious diseases can ‘erode governance
capacities’ and undermine ‘a population’s conﬁdence and trust in the
political leadership and system’.
7
Clearly, then, there are longstanding connections between health and
security. But that does not mean that the contemporary linkage between
health and security is nothing new. To explain why we think there is
something new in play, and to provide background for our argument
in the latter parts of the article, this section sketches a history of the
relationship between security and health. In particular, drawing on
recent developments in international law and policy, it aims to show
that health has come to be ‘looked at through a new lens’.
8
We begin in 1994, the year in which the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) called for attention to be directed towards the
achievement of ‘human security’, ‘an idea...likely to revolutionize
society in the 21st century’.
9 For UNDP, traditional concepts of security
were, on the one hand, too focused on protecting states from ‘external
aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as
global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust’ and, on the
other, not focused enough on ‘the legitimate concerns of ordinary
people who sought security in their daily lives’.
10 UNDP saw ‘human
security’ as a way to address this imbalance. It argued that human secur-
ity could help to protect people from both chronic threats (such as
hunger) and sudden, harmful disruptions of their daily lives.
11
5 Fidler and Gostin, above n 1, at 139–140.
6 IHR (1969) (WHO 1983), Foreword.
7 Fidler and Gostin, above n 1, at 139.
8 WHO, World Health Day: International Health Security: Invest in Health,
Build a Safer Future (WHO 2007) 14.
9 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (OUP 1994) 22.
10 Ibid.
11 Two other events from 1994 help to explain why UNDP had reason to be
concerned about prevailing deﬁnitions of security: ﬁrst, ﬁve states in India
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security emerged. This time it came from a more surprising source:
the UN Security Council, which held a session in January 2000 on
peace, security and HIV/AIDS, focusing in particular on the impact of
AIDS in Africa.
12 The Security Council’s conjunction of peace, security
and HIV/AIDS was novel. So too was its depiction of security and its
explicit reference to the pioneering nature of its own position: it empha-
sised that by discussing HIV/AIDS as a security threat, it was ‘exploring
a brand-new deﬁnition of world security’ and establishing ‘a precedent
for Security Council concern and action on a broader securityagenda’.
13
11 September 2001 (or 9/11) is the next crucial date in this short
history. As Lucia Zedner has explained, ‘[t]he events of that day alter
the landscape of security irrevocably’.
14 Very shortly thereafter,
anthrax letters, sent using the US Postal Service, affected 22 people, of
whom ﬁve died. As a core component of its response to the events of
2001, the United States committed to a range of legislative and regulat-
ory activity designed to improve the preparedness of its public health
law. For example, within weeks of September 11, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had commissioned a draft
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act and, as of 2009, the
United States is scheduled to have its ﬁrst National Health Security
Strategy, designed to augment the extant strategies covering, respect-
ively, the national security of the United States and homeland security.
15
Strongly worded rhetoric on health and security has run alongside
these reforms. Typically, this rhetoric invokes the importance of
experienced an outbreak of plague, causing 56 reported deaths; and second, a
cholera epidemic killed up to 50,000 of the approximately 700,000 refugees
who had ﬂed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to escape the crisis in
Rwanda: see, respectively, DT Dennis, ‘Plague in India’ (1994) 309 Br Med J
893 and DH Waterman, ‘Journey after Darkness – A Study of Goma, Zaire
in 1994: Cholera and Clean Water’, available at http://www.unicef.org.
12 UNSC, The Impact of AIDS on Peace and Security in Africa (10 January
2000) UN Doc. S/PV.4087. In 2001, the UN General Assembly held a
Special Session on HIV/AIDS: see UNGA, Special Session of the General
Assembly on HIV/AIDS: Report of the Secretary-General 16 February
2001 UN Doc. A/55/779, esp. paras 23–38.
13 UNSC, ibid., at 2. Subsequent UNSC resolutions have focused on HIV/AIDS
and peacekeeping operations.
14 L Zedner, ‘The Concept of Security: An Agenda for Comparative Analysis’
(2003) 23 LS 153, at 153.
15 The requirement for a National Health Security Strategy by 2009, and then
every four years thereafter, was set down by PAHPA 2006. For the existing
strategies, see, respectively, The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America (White House 2006) and National Strategy for Homeland
Security (Homeland Security Ofﬁce 2002). The focus is not limited to the
threat of terrorism: natural disasters and naturally-occurring infectious
disease epidemics are included.
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fought on many fronts’ and it emphasises that, just ‘like our system of
national military preparedness’, ‘our public-health armaments must be
in a constant state of readiness’:
Because health threats know no boundaries, we can afford no
weaknesses in our public-health line of defense. Either we are all
protected or we are all at risk.
16
The United States is only one among numerous jurisdictions pursuing
public health emergency preparedness. Put bluntly, ‘vulnerability is
universal’.
17
In 2003, another global health security concern emerged: Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), a new and serious infectious
disease. SARS began to spread internationally in February 2003,
approximately two months after the Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN)—a multi-partner network of agencies
and technical institutions established by WHO
18—had detected a con-
ﬁrmed inﬂuenza outbreak in the Guangdong Province of China. On
12 March 2003, WHO issued its ﬁrst global alert about the new infec-
tious disease. Three days later, it issued a second alert, naming the
disease, offering guidance to health professionals and public health
authorities, and alerting international travellers to the spread of the
disease. Within four months, however, transmission of SARS had
been interrupted in all affected countries and, on 5 July 2003, WHO
announced that the outbreak had been contained. In total, 8,098
cases of SARS were recorded in 26 countries, with 774 documented
deaths (hospital staff were most affected). There were also serious ﬁnan-
cial implications due to disruption of travel, tourism, trade and pro-
duction; WHO’s estimate is that the outbreak cost US $12.3 billion in
the Asian countries affected.
19
The SARS outbreak and its containment produced a range of
responses.
20 China, for example, was criticised for its delay in reporting
16 Dr Jeffrey P Koplan, then director of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC),
speaking in 2001, cited in P Jackson, ‘Funding Biodefense: Public Health,
Bioterrorism, and the Emerging Infrastructure of Biosecurity Research’ in
JC Cohen-Kohler and MB Seaton (eds), Comparative Program on Health
and Security, Lupina Foundation, Working Papers Series 2006–2007
(Munk Center for International Studies 2007) 1–21, 2.
17 WHO, above n 2, at vii, per Margaret Chan.
18 In addition to GOARN, WHO operates a Global Early Warning System for
Major Animal Diseases (GLEWS). An EU agency, the European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control, was established in 2005.
19 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (WHO 2003).
20 These include guidance from WHO on the surveillance and management of a
future outbreak: see WHO Guidelines for the Global Surveillance of SARS,
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by Canada for its unilateral issuance of travel advice to persons
proposing to travel to Toronto, the city outside Asia worst affected
by the outbreak.
21 Meanwhile, in Canada, delays and wrangling
between the Ontario government and the federal government over
funding to provide compensation for individuals may have undermined
the quarantine scheme by leaving people with ﬁnancial incentives to
break quarantine.
22 As part of quarantine and isolation measures,
some jurisdictions, including Canada, adopted policies involving
heavy limitations on individual rights.
23 WHO has said that these
control schemes were responsible for the interruption of transmission
of the disease within four months of the announcement of the outbreak,
but the use of measures that severely restricted individual freedoms was
deeply controversial.
The year 2003 is, however, notable for more than the SARS outbreak
and its containment. It was also the year in which the Commission on
Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen,
issued its ﬁnal report.
24 The Commission labelled illness, disability
and avoidable death as ‘critical pervasive threats’ to human security;
more generally, it harnessed the language of security to highlight the
ongoing neglect of social and economic rights. One year on, in 2004,
‘comprehensive collective security’—described as a ‘new and broader
understanding’ of international security—provided the overall vision
behind the report of the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change.
25 The Panel prescribed an improve-
ment in public health systems, arguing that:
Updated Recommendations (WHO 2004). See, more generally, DP Fidler,
SARS, Governance and the Globalization of Disease (Palgrave Macmillan
2004).
21 National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, Learning from
SARS (Health Canada 2003) at 205.
22 See CM Flood and A Williams, ‘A Tale of Toronto: National and Inter-
national Lessons in Public Health Governance from the SARS Crisis’
(2003/4) 12 Michigan State Journal of International Law 229, at 240.
23 The Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, Public Health: Ethical Issues (NCOB
2007) 52 says that: ‘News reports suggested that in Toronto...over 2,000
people who showed no symptoms of SARS were in quarantine at one point
.... [Q]uarantine ofﬁcers at ports of entry and exit in Canada were given
the authority to ask a person suspected of having the disease to undergo a
medical examination and to detain that person if necessary for up to 20
days (the maximum incubation period set out for SARS).’
24 Human Security Now (Commission on Human Security 2003).
25 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN Depart-
ment of Public Information 2004).
224 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]emergence of new infectious diseases, a resurgence of older diseases
and a spread of resistance to a growing number of mainstay anti-
biotic drugs...signify a dramatic decay in local and global public
health capacity.
26
It also warned that ‘the security of the most afﬂuent State can be held
hostage to the ability of the poorest State to contain an emerging
disease’.
27 And, controversially, it suggested a new role for the UN
Security Council: in its view, in ‘extreme cases of threat posed by a
new emerging infectious disease or international release of an infectious
agent’,
28 it would be appropriate for the Security Council to help with
the implementation of control measures.
The threat of biological terrorism was also invoked by Koﬁ Annan,
then Secretary General of the United Nations, in his 2005 UN reform
strategy, In Larger Freedom. In his view, ‘[o]ur best defence against
this danger lies in strengthening public health’ and he seemed to indicate
that he supported an expanded role for the Security Council in the event
of an ‘overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease that threatens inter-
national peace and security’.
29
A few months later, in May 2005, the World Health Assembly, the
highest decision-making body of WHO, adopted a revised set of Inter-
national Health Regulations (IHR (2005)).
30 These Regulations were
welcomed by the then Director General of WHO as a ‘major step
forward for international health’.
31 They took effect in June 2007,
32
binding WHO Member States on an opt-out basis.
33 They contain 66
articles, organised acrossten parts, and atotal of nine annexes, and, cru-
cially, they are signiﬁcantly different from their predecessors, the Inter-
national Health Regulations (1969). The new Regulations take what has
been described as an ‘“all risks” approach’,
34 encompassing any emer-
gency with repercussions for international health security, including
26 Ibid., at para 47.
27 Ibid., at para 19.
28 Ibid., at para xx.
29 UNGA, In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/2005
21 March 2005 29.
30 International Health Regulations (2005), WHA Res 58.3 23 May 2005.
31 See http://www.who.int/medicacentre/news/releases/2005/pr_wha03.
32 A year prior to this a resolution of the WHA had called on WHO Member
States to ‘comply immediately, on a voluntary basis, with [the IHR] con-
sidered relevant to the risk posed by avian inﬂuenza and pandemic inﬂuenza’:
Application of the International Health Regulations (2005), WHA Res 59.2
26 May 2006.
33 Constitution of WHO, Article 22.
34 DP Fidler and LO Gostin, ‘The New International Health Regulations: An
Historic Development for International Law and Public Health’ (2006) 34
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 85, at 86.
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borne disease, natural disasters, and the accidental or deliberate release
of pathogens, or chemical or radio-nuclear materials.
35 Their purpose
is to:
prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health
response to the international spread of disease in waysthat are com-
mensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which
avoid unnecessary interference with international trafﬁc and
trade.
36
To give effect to this, they place obligations on Member States with
respect to surveillance and response capacities; States are also obliged
to notify WHO of events within their territories that may constitute a
‘public health emergency of international concern’.
37
But what of human rights? Do they feature in the new IHR? Put
shortly, the answer is yes. Article 3(1) contains the ﬁrst reference to
human rights: it states that the implementation of the IHR is to be
‘with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental free-
doms of persons’. Thereafter, human rights crop up in a number of
articles. Article 42, for example, provides that all health measures must
be applied in a transparent and non-discriminatory way. Informed
consent and information privacy feature in several articles, including
Article 23 which provides that States Parties must not apply health
measures such as vaccination, medical examination or isolation to inter-
national travellers without ‘prior express informed consent’, save in cir-
cumstances wherethereis‘evidence ofanimminentpublic healthrisk’.
38
Article 45(1) provides that States Parties must treat personal health
information in a conﬁdential manner ‘as required by national law’.
More generally, the new IHR feature requirements concerning any limit-
ationsonrightsthatarefamiliarfrominternationalhumanrightslaw.So,
for example, WHO recommendations to States Parties, and health
measures implemented by States Parties in response to identiﬁable
risks, must be ‘no more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably
available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health
35 See Article 1 for deﬁnitions of the terms ‘public health risk’ and ‘public health
emergency of international concern’.
36 Article 2. Article 3(4), however, emphasises that States Parties have ‘the
sovereign right to legislate and to implement legislation in pursuance of
their health policies’, noting that in so doing they should uphold the IHR.
37 See, respectively, Articles 5, 13 and Annex 1, and Article 6 and Annex 2.
38 If there is such evidence, then international travellers may be advised or com-
pelled to submit to control measures such as vaccination, quarantine and
isolation.
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39 The IHR also give WHO a new power to use information
about disease outbreaks provided by unofﬁcial sources (for example,
non-governmentalorganisationsorindividualscientists).
40Signiﬁcantly,
WHO has described this new power as a ‘revolutionary departure from
previous international conventions and regulations’.
41
III. HUMANISING SECURITY, SECURITISING PUBLIC
HEALTH: THE VIEW FROM HUMAN RIGHTS
So, how should a human rights lawyer respond to the panoply of new
linkages between health and security and, more speciﬁcally, the increas-
ing focus on public health emergency preparedness? In this section of the
article, we outline two possible responses. We use broad strokes, not
close detail: the aim is to provide a sense of the most likely human
rights responses and to ﬂag up why, in our view, they point to a need
for greater human rights preparedness.
The ﬁrst possible human rights response to public health emergency
preparedness is to embrace it, even acclaim it. This response will see
public health being brought ‘in from the cold’—its proﬁle raised and
increased resources directed towards it—as a result of the new linkage
between health and security. Preparedness, it will suggest, is a
‘win-win’. Speciﬁcally, investment in countering biothreats offers not
just the possibility of protection against bioterrorism, but also enhanced
public health given that ‘the more research in weaponized diseases that
takes place, the more innovations for disease prevention will be
found’.
42 Investment in hospitals, it will argue, should also receive a
boost as a result of the new focus on preparedness: after all, ‘if a bio-
weapon is released and people get sick, they will go to hospital ﬁrst’.
43
Faced with historical evidence of abuse committed in the name of
public health, and of a traditionally hands-off response by the judiciary
when faced with challenges to public health measures,
44 this ﬁrst
response is likely to counter-claim that human rights have been expli-
citly built-in as part of the IHR. It may also argue that States Parties
39 Article 43(1) re States Parties; see also Articles 23 and 31. As regards WHO
recommendations, see Article 17.
40 See Articles 9, 10 and 11. WHO is required to seek ofﬁcial veriﬁcation from
the state concerned before taking action. It can share the information with
other states if the affected state does not cooperate with veriﬁcation and
control efforts, ‘when justiﬁed by the magnitude of the public health risk’.
41 Above n 2, at xv.
42 Jackson, above n 16, at 8.
43 Ibid., at 17.
44 For the United States, see LO Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty,
Restraint (2nd edn California UP 2008).
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IHR. David Fidler, for example, has emphasised that:
[e]xcept for the Security Council’s authority under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, I cannot think of any other international organis-
ation the States Parties of which have granted to the Director-
General material power in this way, to do countries severe econ-
omic and political damage, over their objection.
45
This ﬁrst response will probably also argue that the overall response to
HIV/AIDS shows that the linkage between health and human rights is
now both accepted and embedded as best practice. The ascent of
human rights in the popular imagination and in national, and inter-
national, legal and political orders might also be invoked. And, linked
to this, it is likely that emphasis will be placed not just on the emergence
of a ‘right to human security’ but also the fact that, today, neither states
nor private actors (such as pharmaceutical companies) can afford to
ignore human rights. Putting that another way, this ﬁrst response will
point out that, today, rights are a potential risk for states and private
actors.
We think that this ﬁrst response will also make claims focused on
‘what works’. Two particular claims spring to mind. The ﬁrst addresses
international co-operation: it will counter the argument that state sover-
eignty is an insurmountable obstacle to co-operation with evidence from
the SARS outbreak in 2003—in particular, WHO’s unilateral issuance
of a travel advisory and, relatedly, the fact that Canada was ‘a model
of transparency in its reporting and public information, of determi-
nation in its contact tracing’.
46 In short, and in the words of the then
Executive Director of Communicable Diseases at WHO, the argument
will be that:
The outbreak of SARS in 2003 and its successful global contain-
ment are testimony to a new way of working internationally for
the public good.
47
There is another possible version of the ‘what works’ argument, which
focuses on drawing-out the rights potential of the language of security.
It will run as follows: if, as seems to be the case in the counter-terrorism
context, security and human rights are increasingly represented as in
45 House of Lords Select Committee on Intergovernmental Organisations, Dis-
eases Know No Frontiers: How Effective Are Intergovernmental Organis-
ations in Controlling Their Spread? (Volume II: Evidence, HL 143-II
Stationery Ofﬁce 2008) 38.
46 A WHO ofﬁcial, quoted in Flood and Williams, above n 22, at 244.
47 David Heymann, quoted in Fidler, above n 20, at xi.
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use security—speciﬁcally, a right to security—as a way to bolster human
rights? This argument will then go on to emphasise that states’ obli-
gations vis-a `-vis positive rights (that is, economic, social and cultural
rights) could also be bolstered by emphasising the importance of
human security.
There is though a second, very different, human rights response to
public health emergency preparedness and the wider securitisation of
health. As we see it, its deﬁning stance will range from anxiety to out-
right opposition, and it absolutely will not share the optimism of the
ﬁrst response. For instance, faced with the latter’s claims on
‘win-win’, its position is likely to be that preparedness distorts public
health priorities, with negative consequences everywhere, but especially
in developing states. Securitisation, it will argue, compromises the
public’s health as it clambers after public health as security. Moreover,
even if one accepts the skewing of attention towards preparedness, isn’t
it the case—it will argue—that the preparedness project is out of
balance? Why does investment in neglected diseases continue to lose
out so heavily in terms of funding? And, if hospital ‘surge capacity’ is
a core issue, why hasn’t there been more investment in public hospitals?
Claims of a new, co-operative world order will also be met with incre-
dulity. Co-operation on preparedness is essential and is embedded in the
IHR, but it is also incredibly fragile, as was made clear in 2006–07
when Indonesia temporarily stopped sharing samples of the human
avian inﬂuenza virus with WHO.
48 The cessation was prompted by
the Indonesian government’s anger at what it saw as the commercial
exploitation of developing countries. The catalyst for this was the
announcement by an Australian pharmaceutical company that it had
developed a vaccine and could manufacture enough to protect the Aus-
tralian public within six months. The company was one of a number
that had received Indonesian samples from WHO. Indonesia pulled
out of sample-sharing with WHO, insisting that WHO change the
rules to stop commercial abuse of poorer countries. It also allegedly
entered into an arrangement with a US-based pharmaceutical
company to provide samples in return for affordable access to any
vaccine that might be developed.
It is very likely that this second grouping of human rights advocates—
let us call them linkage-sceptics—will also take avery different stance on
the contemporary standing of human rights. It is true, the sceptics will
agree, that human rights are built into the IHR. Ultimately, however,
Article 3 of the IHR reserves the sovereign right of States Parties to
48 WHO News Release, 27 March 2007, available at http://www.who.int.
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sound science. Moreover, the human rights provisions in the IHR
have ‘little to say about protection of livelihoods and food security, or
potential health impacts that might result from the distortion of
public health priorities towards global surveillance’.
49 The
linkage-sceptic is also likely to point to a problem arising from a less
obvious source: the health and human rights movement itself. This
movement encompasses two different approaches to public health and
human rights, one that forthrightly acknowledges the potential
tension between public health necessity and human rights, and
another that rejects the assumption of such a tension and instead sees
the pursuit of public health and human rights as inextricably linked.
One consequence of this has been vigorous intra-movement debate
about the extent and inevitability of conﬂicts and trade-offs between
public health and liberty.
50 This debate is both inevitable and deeply
useful, but there is a problem in that, in an ‘age of preparedness’,
robust debate amongst rights advocates about the pros and cons of
trade-offs could be read in a way that puts rights at risk.
Threats to human rights—and indeed, human rights as a threat—are
nothing new. The hype, or ‘myth’, of rights is a claim that is familiar
from empirical socio-legal work on rights. Problems with rights have
also been emphasised by rights-sceptics.
51 The point though is that,
lately, a new link between human rights and risk has emerged, largely
as a result of post 9/11 rhetoric about life in a ‘time of crisis’. Its pos-
ition, in crude terms, is that exceptional times mandate exceptional
measures to deal with risk. As Liora Lazarus and Benjamin Goold
have pointed out, ‘the idea that certain human rights can be “turned
off” when necessary’ has acquired remarkable power; it is now widely
regarded as a ‘thoroughly reasonable reaction to the dangers allegedly
faced by democratic societies’.
52 And, as they go on to emphasise:
the exceptionalism argument has become pivotal, so much so that
liberals and human rights organisations must either rebut claims
49 B Von Tigerstrom, Human Security and International Law: Prospects and
Problems (Hart 2007) 207.
50 Compare, e.g. GJ Annas, American Bioethics: Crossing Human Rights and
Health Law Boundaries (OUP 2005); LO Gostin, ‘When Terrorism Threa-
tens Health: How Far are Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties
Justiﬁed?’ (2003) 55 Florida Law Review 1105.
51 See, respectively, SA Scheingold, The Politics of Rights (2nd edn Michigan
UP 2004); T Campbell and others (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights
(OUP 2001).
52 L Lazarus and BJ Goold, ‘Security and Human Rights: The Search for a
Language of Reconciliation’ in BJ Goold and L Lazarus (eds), Security and
Human Rights (Hart 2007) 1–26, at 4.
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exceptional conditions by adjusting our institutions, practices, pro-
cedures and laws.
53
In this environment, human rights advocates debating the relationship
between public health and human rights need to be extremely careful.
54
The ascent of post 9/11 exceptionalism is also reason to be deeply
wary of upbeat, optimistic assessments concerning the relationship
between security and human rights. For the linkage-sceptic, the hope
that has been invested in the idea of a ‘right to security’ is misplaced,
not least because this right could take shape as an argument against
human rights. Think, for example, of the claim that human rights are
no more than a tool used and abused by ‘minorities’, especially ‘danger-
ous, violent minorities’. This tends to be accompanied by another claim:
namely, it is the right to security of ‘law-abiding, decent people’ to live
safe and secure from crime and violence that has been neglected and
needs shoring up.
55 Moreover, these claims do not crop up only in the
context of terrorism. As Jonathan Montgomery has pointed out, in
the UK, discussions on the criminalisation of disease transmission
have been fed by metaphors of disease carriers ‘as markedly different
from “normal” members of society’, encouraging ‘people to think of
the transmission of disease as the province of evil criminals, not
people like them’. Speciﬁcally:
Those being prosecuted are [now] demonized less for their disease
status than as sexual predators, and coverage shows a strong racial
overtone. ...AIDS is no longer presented as a gay plague but an
African one. Even more clearly the protection of victims from
aggressors has emerged as the rationale for criminalization, obscur-
ing public health issues. The innocence of the victims and the evil of
the aggressor are stressed.
56
In our view, the sceptic’s argument makes a great deal of sense. Put
bluntly, amidst the new ‘rights revolution’, which is characterised by a
53 Ibid.
54 See, relatedly, N Hunter, ‘“Public-Private” Health Law: Multiple Directions
in Public Health’ (2007) 10 Journal of Health Care Law & Policy 101 at 106:
‘Command and control, in some form, is surely an indispensable mode for
governmental response to an emergency....But in a form of mission creep
and professional norm migration, all aspects of health emergency policy
have shifted towards the framework of enhanced executive authority.’
55 See, further, I Loader, ‘The Cultural Lives of Security and Rights’ in Goold
and Lazarus (eds), above n 52, at 27–44.
56 J Montgomery, ‘Medicalizing Crime – Criminalizing Health? The Role of
Law’ in CA Erin and S Ost (eds), The Criminal Justice System and Health
Care (OUP 2007) 257–72, at 267. See generally M Weait, Intimacy and
Responsibility (Routledge-Cavendish 2007).
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sentiment that queries the legitimacy of rights in a time of alleged crisis,
there are no guarantees that the securitisation of public health, the right
to security or human security will be good for human rights.
57 More-
over, we know from history that, in the past, terrible abuses have
been committed in the name of public health.
58 We have a potential
problem, however, because in addition to agreeing with the sceptic’s
argument, we also agree with at least some of the optimist’s argument.
In particular, we cannot see how being ‘against security’ is a viable
stance. In what follows, we try to address our split reaction by thinking
through how human rights could engage more effectively with security.
IV. TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS PREPAREDNESS: RISK
WITHIN RIGHTS AND RIGHTS AS RISK
In this section, we focus on moving towards human rights preparedness
in the ‘age of preparedness’. In particular, we focus on risk, an increas-
ingly common thread in contemporary debates about security. We ask:
how does the identiﬁcation and management of public health risks, tied
explicitly in the IHR to the use of scientiﬁc principles and evidence, ﬁt
with human rights? We argue that, in order to answer this, human
rights advocates need to direct greater critical attention towards prevail-
ing interpretations of the relationship between risk and rights.
59 We
propose two frames of enquiry: ﬁrst, risk within rights and, secondly,
rights as risk. Thinking through these frames is, we suggest, an essential
foil to the now-conventional mode of thinking about risk and rights
which ﬁxates on risk versus rights.
As its name suggests, the ﬁrst frame—risk within rights—emphasises
risk as a component of human rights law. It emphasises, in particular,
that the prevention of (future) harm can be interpreted within the
existing framework of human rights.
60 Our second frame—rights as
57 For discussion, see Goold and Lazarus above n 52; I Loader and N Walker
Civilising Security (CUP 2007); Von Tigerstrom, above n 49, at 204–13.
58 See, e.g. JD Moreno, Undue Risk: Secret State Experiments on Humans
(Routledge 2001). Today, in some countries, there is the additional compli-
cation that public health is being deployed as a tool of crime control: see,
further, N Rose, The Politics of Life Itself (Princeton UP 2007) esp. 241–51.
59 Examinations of the relationship include R Coker and others, ‘Detention and
the Evolving Threat of Tuberculosis: Evidence, Ethics and Law’ (2007) 35
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 609; Gostin, above n 44, 85–107.
60 See, relatedly, JF Childress and R Gaare Bernheim, ‘Beyond the Liberal and
Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for Public Health’
(2003) 55 Florida Law Review 1191, at 1218: ‘What is required is an alterna-
tive that moves beyond the liberal-communitarian impasse and beyond balan-
cing libertyagainst public health/security. In our judgment, such aframework
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ance: the assessment and management of risk. Governments and organ-
isations (whether national or international, and public, private or
public-private in character) are expected to identify and prioritise the
range of risks (ﬁnancial, legal, political, reputational, regulatory, etc.)
to which they are exposed. The particular point we want to draw out
from this isthat managing risk means managing the riskof rights. More-
over, this risk is not limited to legal risk, that is, (potential) claims and
litigation for violation of human rights obligations. Rather, because
human rights are more than human rights law, rights as risk also encom-
passes the potential for human rights consciousness (as manifested, for
example, in a public campaign) to disrupt the interests and overall
standing of governments and organisations.
A. Risk within Rights
In many respects, ‘risk’ is not new ground for human rights lawyers. The
terminology of risk was not widely used in the past, but analysing how
threats to public health could be dealt with in a manner compatible with
the normative frameworks of human rights instruments is an exercise
that should be familiar to human rights lawyers. International instru-
ments, including the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), enable States Parties to derogate from certain human
rights in the event of public emergencies that threaten ‘the life of the
nation’.
61 At other times, limitations on non-absolute rights are per-
mitted, provided certain conditions are met. For example, interference
with Article 8 ECHR on the right to privacy is justiﬁed if it is legally pre-
scribed, serves a legitimate purpose and can be proved to be ‘necessary
in a democratic society’. For the European Court of Human Rights, the
principle of proportionality is a key component of the latter ‘democratic
necessity’ test.
62 More broadly, although the intensity of review in indi-
vidual contexts (for example, interference with the right to liberty or
privacy), and the exact legal terminology and method used, will
differ, common judicial approaches towards questions of justiﬁcation
must recognize that liberty is part of our communal interests, along with
public health....’
61 As regardsthe ICCPR, see also the 1984 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation
and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR. See, also, the ‘intervention ladder’
proposed by the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics in its recent report on public
health, above n 23.
62 See, generally, R Clayton and H Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights
(OUP 2000) 261–339. On the historical variations in the Strasbourg
Court’s approach, see A McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the
Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Juris-
prudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 62 MLR 671.
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63 It is simply not correct
therefore to claim that human rights law fails to deal with risk, or that a
choice always has to be made between risk and rights. It is possible to
identify—through the structure and interpretive principles of human
rights instruments—the means to mediate the relationship between
risk and rights. Putting that another way, the framework of human
rights law can, and already does, address issues of risk.
Until very recently, however, the identiﬁcation of a ‘risk within rights’
approach did not register either among human rights lawyers or in the
public imagination more generally. One explanation for this is that,
for understandable reasons, lawyers did not pay much attention to the
meaning, and role, of risk.
64 It was not a focus of critical concern
(even though it was present in ‘everyday’ legal contexts—for example,
identifying risk factors and making predictive judgements in relation
to detention, imprisonment, mental health, child protection, asylum
or deportation). Instead, it was for the most part accepted as an uncon-
troversial component of the expert, scientiﬁc evidence put forward in
support of one’s legal arguments.
65 But a change has taken place due
to the new societal emphasis on (in)security and public protection. Sig-
niﬁcantly, in some jurisdictions, the new post 9/11 national security
context has generated strong demand for greater prioritisation of
risk
66—even if this comes at the expense of established human rights
norms.
67 The risk and rights relationship, in other words, is being
framed as riskor rights—and rights seem to be at a substantial disadvan-
tage. There is though a new critical counter-terrorism scholarship which
is ﬁghting this dangerous turn. In our view, its arguments need to be
read very closely by those working on public health emergency prepa-
redness, not least because of the effect that a ‘risk or rights’ approach
63 Fora recent surveyof case law in ﬁve European jurisdictions, see B Goold and
others, Public Protection, Proportionality and the Search for Balance (2007)
Ministry of Justice Research Series 10/07.
64 For a detailed version of this argument, see T Murphy and N Whitty, ‘Risk
and Human Rights in UK Prison Governance’ (2007) 47 British Journal of
Criminology 798.
65 See, e.g. Enhorn v Sweden [2005] 41 EHRR 633 wherein the ECtHR did not
comment upon the character and dynamics of risk-based evidence in asses-
sing the legality of the compulsory detention of an individual on the
grounds of public health. For discussion of this case, see R Martin, ‘The Exer-
cise of Public Health Powers in Cases of Infectious Disease: Human Rights
Implications’ (2006) 14 Med LR 132.
66 See G Mythen and S Walklate, ‘Communicating the Terrorist Risk: Harnes-
sing a Culture of Fear’ (2006) 2 Crime Media Culture 123; ‘Criminology and
Terrorism: Which Thesis? Risk Society or Governmentality?’ (2005) 45
British Journal of Criminology 1.
67 See C Gearty, ‘The Superpatriotic Fervour of the Moment’ (2008) 28 OJLS
183.
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interpretation and use of national preparedness measures.
Three insights from critical counter-terrorism scholarship merit par-
ticular attention. First, it should not be assumed that the human rights
argument has been won: the reasons why human rights need to be pro-
tected have to be explained again and again, without fail. Arguments,
especially ofﬁcial ones, which insist that human rights norms have no
place in times of emergency mean that counter-argument needs to be
seen as constant requirement.
68 Secondly, defending human rights in
an era of heightened security-consciousness entails not just closer
engagement with the contemporary politics of security, but also recog-
nition of the value of security.
69 And, thirdly, a human rights spotlight
on the language and practices of risk assessment and management is
essential in order to evaluate the legitimacy of responses to public
health threats.
In thinking about risk within rights in the context of public health
emergency preparedness, these points suggest a range of strategies. For
example, the use of coercive measures—such as quarantine—requires
particularly strong justiﬁcation. These measures infringe liberty and
privacy rights and, if mistakes are made, healthy individuals are put at
serious risk of infection. The threat of quarantine can lead individuals
to delay seeking diagnosis and treatment. It can also provoke or com-
pound discrimination and stigmatisation of particular individuals and
groups. And, as Lucia Zedner has pointed out, the use of risk categories
to target certain groups can create a further problem:
At one level, it makes perfect sense to target security measures at
those deemed most to threaten. Yet an inherent dangerof selectivity
is that precisely because it imposes restrictions only on targeted sec-
tions of the population, it is less likely to invoke the natural political
resistance generated by burdens that affect us all.
70
68 On the salience of post 9/11 ‘anti-human rights’ sentiments, practices and
legal scholarship in some countries, see, further, J Waldron, ‘Torture and
Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House’ (2005) 105 Columbia
Law Review 1681.
69 See, e.g. Loaderand Walker, above n 57; L Zedner, ‘Neither Safe Nor Sound?
The Perils and Possibilities of Risk’ (2006) 48 Canadian Journal of Crimi-
nology and Criminal Justice 423.
70 L Zedner, ‘Seeking Security by Eroding Rights: The Side-Stepping of Due
Process’ in Goold and Lazarus, above n 52, at 257–75 at 272. See, further,
K Hannah-Moffat and P O’Malley (eds), Gendered Risks (Glasshouse
2007); N Whitty, ‘MAPPA for Kids: Discourses of Security, Risk and Chil-
dren’s Rights’ in K Baker and A Sutherland (eds), Multi-Agency Public Pro-
tection Arrangements and Youth Justice (Policy Press 2009) 115–28.
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developing an account of risk-based evidence and its relationship to
human rights. Some public health commentators, discussing coercive
measures, have begun to advocate a direct linkage between riskexpertise
and human rights standards:
An approach, which might enable the formulation of a body of
public health ethics acceptable to human rights jurisprudence is
to introduce into the language of ethics and rights the notion of
evidence-based assessment of risk.
71
This approach, they argue, could help to bring consistency and coher-
ence to the ‘balancing [of] the common public health good with individ-
ual rights’.
72 For this to be true, critical counter-terrorism scholarship
suggests that two particular problems will need to be addressed: the
ﬁrst concerns the terminology of balance; the second concerns the
nature and role of risk-based evidence in legal processes.
The metaphor of balance—which is now widely used in debates about
appropriate legal responses to the risk of terrorism—has the potential to
undermine human rights. As Andrew Ashworth has argued, the imagery
of balancing assumes a ‘hydraulic relationship between human rights
safeguards and the promotion of security’: speciﬁcally, ‘as one goes up
the other must go down, and vice versa’.
73 Balancing, unlike propor-
tionality, ‘involves a broad brush, and sometimes opaque, analysis
aimed at a resolution of the interests at stake and the rights involved’.
It uses a ‘utilitarian analysis of the rights and public interest goals in
question, giving no signiﬁcantly greater weight to rights than to security
measures’.
74 Proportionality, in contrast, is more protective of human
rights: speciﬁcally, under the proportionality approach, there is a pre-
sumption that rights restrict public interest goals. Rights outweigh
goals that are not legitimate and, where goals are legitimate, any
measures giving effect to them must be suitable, the least restrictive poss-
ible, and proportionate between the effects of the measures and the
objectives to be achieved.
75
71 Coker and others, above n 59, at 612.
72 Ibid., at 613 (emphasis added).
73 A Ashworth, ‘Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights’ in Goold
and Lazarus, above n 52, at 203–26 at 208. See, also, Childress and Gaare
Bernheim, above n 60, arguing for the rejection of ‘metaphorical balancing’;
L Zedner, ‘Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reﬂections from Criminal
Justice’ (2005) 32 JLS 507.
74 Goold and others, above n 63, at 2.
75 For discussion of the proportionality test in different jurisdictions, see
Clayton and Tomlinson, above n 62, at 278–303.
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porary security debates, in the terrorism and public health ﬁelds, is the
increased reliance on risk-based evidence and expertise. Human rights
scholars have argued that, if risk evidence is to be used to justify limit-
ations on rights, the evidence of threats to security must be disclosed and
scrutinised according to identiﬁable legal norms.
76 Clearly, where there
is litigation, it is the judges’ approaches to risk that will be crucial. His-
torically, many types of expert evidence pertaining to public or national
security were viewed as non-justiciable. And, where judicial intervention
did occur, the actual level of scrutiny was often minimal and deferential
to government assertions and experts.
77 Today, however, what we have
labelled as ‘risk within rights’ is beginning to be openly articulated by
the judiciary in security contexts. Speciﬁcally, in some jurisdictions, in
response to concerns about the nature, and direction, of recent anti-
terrorism legislation and practice—including preventative detention,
surveillance and deportation of suspected individuals—judges have
started to engage openly, and more critically, with the relationship
between risk and human rights.
78 This is a welcome development. But
a wider and deeper engagement will be needed in order to dislodge
the zero-sum representation of risk and human rights, and among
other things this will require an exploration of the tendency to think
of risk as an expert, rational or scientiﬁc knowledge, and human
rights as a value-based legal knowledge.
79
B. Rights as Risk
We shift now to the complex terrain of ‘rights as risk’. As noted
earlier, the prompt for this second frame is that risk management has
become a pre-eminent concern for governments and organisations
(whether public, private or public–private in character)—to quote
Michael Power, we are in the midst of ‘the risk management of
76 See D Feldman, ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: The Role of Politicians
and Judges’ [2006] PL 364.
77 See N Whitty, T Murphy and S Livingstone, Civil Liberties Law: The Human
Rights Act Era (Butterworths 2001) ch 7.
78 See the discussion of UK and Canadian national security cases in T Poole,
‘Courts and Conditions of Uncertainty in “Times of Crisis”’ [2008] PL
234. See also Saadi v Italy (Applic. No. 37291/06, February 28 2008)
wherein the ECtHR upheld the absolute ban on deportation of terrorism sus-
pects to countries where they face a ‘real risk’ of torture.
79 See E Fisher, Risk, Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart
2007); S Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe
and the United States (Princeton UP 2005); T Murphy and N Whitty, ‘Risk
and Human Rights: Ending Slopping Out in a Scottish Prison’ in J
Morison and others (eds), Judges, Transition and Human Rights (OUP
2007) 535–57; M Valverde and others, ‘Legal Knowledges of Risk’ in Law
Commission of Canada (ed), Law and Risk (UBC Press 2005) 86–120.
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80 In this section, we focus on organisational risk, emphasis-
ing that this includes management of the risk of rights, and we consider
what this might mean for the project of human rights preparedness.
81 As
we explain below, we take the view that a human rights engagement
with ‘rights as risk’ is both necessary and undeniably complex.
Organisational risk is an umbrella term covering the possible risks
affecting an organisation (including, for example, government depart-
ments, regulatory bodies and pharmaceutical companies). The organis-
ational risks that have to be managed vary widely and are generally
classed as reputational, ﬁnancial, legal, political and operational in
nature. The regulatory space in which the organisation operates will
be a key factor. Inﬂuences, demands and obligations can be exerted
from numerous directions—for example, from international insti-
tutions, governments, state regulatory bodies, courts, professional
associations, corporations, shareholders, trades union, litigants,
NGOs, the public and the media.
82
Human rights are a particularly complex organisational risk. They
encompass, but are not limited to, legal risk: that is, (potential)
claims and litigation for human rights law violations. Rather, because
human rights are more than human rights law, rights as an organis-
ational risk are also about the capacity of human rights consciousness
(as manifested, for example, in community group protests) to adversely
affect the interests of the organisation. Furthermore, foran organisation,
risks exist in both engaging with, and rejecting, human rights. Michael
Likosky, discussing the imperative of governments and private compa-
nies to manage human rights risks in joint projects, emphasises that
organisations’ risk-mitigation strategies will vary. For example:
Do they address the underlying human rights problem itself,
making a project more respectful of human rights? Do they discre-
dit the NGO or community group campaign? Do they negotiate
with one NGO but not with another? Do they assuage the concerns
80 M Power, Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management
(OUP 2007) 203.
81 There are substantial literatures on regulation, risk and human rights but
there has not been much overlap between all three. See, further, B Morgan,
‘The Intersection of Rights and Regulation: New Directions in Sociolegal
Scholarship’ in B Morgan (ed), The Intersection of Rights and Regulation:
New Directions in Sociolegal Scholarship (Ashgate 2007) 1–19;
H Rothstein and others, ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling
Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk’ (2006) 35 Economy
and Society 91.
82 See, generally, C Hood and others (eds), The Government of Risk: Under-
standing Risk Regulation Regimes (OUP 2004); BM Hutter and CJ Jones,
‘From Government to Governance: External Inﬂuences on Business Risk
Management’ (2007) 1 Regulation & Governance 27.
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they adopt binding or nonbinding measures? Do they establish
commissions to review human rights practices of speciﬁc
projects?
83
In the public health emergency ﬁeld, a wide range of inﬂuences,
demands and obligations have the capacity to lead to the construction
of rights as a risk. Indeed, the cross-sector and cross-jurisdiction
nature of public health emergencies (especially those of ‘international
concern’) creates an especially complex governance landscape: distinct
histories, cultures and agendas will be colliding in times of crisis when
immediate responses are expected. In what follows, we outline a range
of reasons why, from an organisational risk perspective, rights are
likely to seen as a risk in the ﬁeld of public health emergency
preparedness.
One obvious source of risk is the mounting number of human rights
instruments and, as a result of increased litigation and the migration of
legal arguments, the worldwide expansion of human rights-referencing
case law.
84 The campaign to expand corporate liability for human rights
violations is another source: although corporate opposition to new
legally binding duties persists, this campaign has encouraged companies
to commit to improved self-regulation.
85 Another source is the human
rights demands found within the conditional loan agreements between
international organisations (such as the World Bank) and recipient gov-
ernments, or within the contractual and public procurement rules relat-
ing to the providers of public goods and services.
86 Global health
governance is also characterised by an increasingly inﬂuential role for
hybrid and non-state actors, including NGOs (such as Me ´decins Sans
Frontie `res), public–private partnerships (such as the Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI)), and private foundations
(such as the Gates Foundation). Indeed, in evidence to a UK Parliamen-
tary committee, David Fidler stated that:
Increasingly, the Gates Foundation is the ﬁrst place people will pick
up the phone to call; not the WHO. In fact, someone told me – and
83 MB Likosky, Law, Infrastructure and Human Rights (CUP 2006) 50.
84 See C McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judi-
cial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 499.
85 See D Kinley and R Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corpor-
ations: The Private Implications of Public International Law’ (2006) 6
Human Rights Law Review 447.
86 See, generally, M Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law (Hart
2003); D McBarnet and others (eds), The New Corporate Accountability:
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (CUP 2007).
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Indonesia to help intervene in that controversy over virus sharing.
Something has changed here.
87
In federal states, the legal relationship between federal and local govern-
ment may constitute rights as a risk in the public health emergency ﬁeld.
On the one hand, a strong states’ rights tradition can hamper, or be used
as an excuse by, federal government in developing particular national
preparedness measures. On the other hand, however, where federal gov-
ernment seeks aggressively to assert its power and interfere with pro-
tected human rights, a tradition of strong states’ rights could be a
bulwark against such abuse.
88
The levels of public trust in a particular national culture will also
inﬂuence rights as risk perspectives.
89 Lesley Jacobs, in a study of the
divergent uses of quarantine in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Toronto
during the SARS crisis, attributes the more extensive use of quarantine
in Toronto to the particular legal consciousness of senior public
health ofﬁcials: ‘health security was weighed much more heavily than
rights concerns...whereas in Hong Kong and Shanghai there was
much more of an even balance’.
90 But, even though there was dissent
in Toronto, courts and human rights bodies were not used to raise con-
cerns about rights violations. One federal public health ofﬁcial has
speculated that:
The belief that the decisions about SARS by senior public ofﬁcials,
provided that they had a legal basis, would be made fairly was so
deeply ingrained among the public that there was little need to
question or scrutinize those decisions.
91
Jacobs’s explanation for the non-use of courts is that legal avenues of
redress might not be seen as appropriate ‘where the health security of
the community is at stake’.
92 From an organisational risk perspective,
this phenomenon could be used as a reason to dismiss rights as a risk
and, more speciﬁcally, to downgrade the need for rights protection in
87 House of Lords Select Committee, above n 45, at 381.
88 On the United States, see SJ Collier and A Lakoff, ‘Distributed Preparedness:
The Spatial Logic of Domestic Security in the United States’ (2008) 26
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 7.
89 See, relatedly, E Jackson, ‘Death, Euthanasia and the Medical Profession’ in
B Brooks-Gordon and others (eds), Death Rites and Rights (Hart 2007)
37–55.
90 LA Jacobs, ‘Rights and Quarantine during the SARS Global Health Crisis:
Differentiated Legal Consciousness in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Toronto’
(2007) 41 Law and Society Review 511, at 514.
91 Ibid., at 546.
92 Ibid.
240 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]preparedness planning and implementation. This, however, would be
counter-productive. As James Childress and Ruth Gaare Bernheim
have argued, ‘public justiﬁcation, deliberation, and other relationship-
building activities may be more important for biopreparedness than
state power because they maintain and nurture civic ideals, cooperation,
and trust’.
93 Moreover, Childress and Gaare Bernheim’s argument can
be extended to encompass the role of the private sector in sustaining
public trust during an emergency. To give just one example: an employ-
er’s policy on matters such as job security has a very real capacity either
to aid or to hinder the extent of voluntary compliance with quarantine
requirements.
But it is not just national cultures that merit attention in thinking
about rights as risk: organisational cultures also ‘shape how human
rights are framed, interpreted and institutionalised’.
94 Article 3(1) of
the IHR states that implementation of the Regulations is to be ‘with
full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms
of persons’. The extent of internalisation of human rights within
WHO is, therefore, crucial. Little, however, is known about this as
the Organization has not been the focus of human rights or, indeed,
regulation scholarship.
95 But it is obvious that the range of internal
staff responses will play a signiﬁcant role in the design, implementation
and monitoring of any human rights-based policies. We can also specu-
late that any internal divisions on human rights will both increase
WHO’s own exposure to organisational risk and affect the handling
of the speciﬁc human rights matter in question. Consider, for
example, Galit Sarfaty’s study of interpretations of human rights at
the World Bank. Comparing World Bank investment projects relating
to HIV/AIDS prevention in Russia and Saint Lucia, Sarfaty speculates
on the reasons why different framings of the human rights dimension
were adopted in each case:
One reason may be that the project team was dominated by staff
who preferacost-beneﬁt analysisto a legal approach, and who con-
cluded that funds would be better spent on other preventative pro-
jects. ...The Russian Government [also] treats the human rights of
[Persons Living With HIV/AIDS] as a sensitive, politically-charged
93 Above n 60, at 1210.
94 GA Sarfaty, ‘Doing Good Business or Just Doing Good: Competing Human
Rights Frameworks at the World Bank’ in Morgan, above n 81, at 93–106,
at 93.
95 See, e.g. DC Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1490, at 1550–54. See
also, House of Lords Select Committee, above n 45, Volume I: Report, HL
493-I, para 201: ‘Reforming WHO’s internal structure is an essential,
though challenging, prerequisite of improving global health governance.’
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ment took the same view, Russia holds much more inﬂuence than
Saint Lucia over Bank project design because it is a major borrower
and not a country that the Bank wants to upset.
96
She also highlights two different core approaches to human rights
among World Bank staff: she labels the ﬁrst ‘instrumental’ and the
second ‘intrinsic’. Staff who adopt an intrinsic framework draw on
either moral or legal imperatives and, overall, they see human rights
in normative terms as an end in themselves. The instrumentalists, in con-
trast, see rights as a means to an end, using a functionalist,
economics-driven rationale to determine whether, and how, human
rights have value in any given case.
We believe that thinking about ‘rights as risk’ should be a key aspect
of human rights preparedness. Human rights advocates need to recog-
nise the growing signiﬁcance of organisational risk and, in particular,
the ways in which organisational culture intertwines with risk and
rights. In addition, human rights needs to reﬂect on the emergence,
from within its ranks, of the ‘human rights risk strategist’. Likosky, dis-
cussing public–private partnership infrastructure projects in different
countries, highlights how governments and other organisations may
aim to ‘advance human rights interests for their own ethical or strategic
reasons’, and may therefore enter into negotiations and alliances with
certain NGOs.
97 Human rights ‘risk consultants’, drawn from legal
and other backgrounds, may also be employed by governments and
organisations, to offer expertise on particular projects and human
rights campaigns. Looking speciﬁcally at the public health emergency
context, it can be argued that WHO’s new power under the IHR to
use information about disease outbreaks provided by unofﬁcial
sources gives governments an added incentive to work with NGOs
and this, in turn, gives NGOs increased inﬂuence. The end result is
likely to be a mixture of human rights agendas, including—and this is
the key point—human rights advocates adopting instrumentalist strat-
egies and language (for example, urging the need to avoid ‘business
risk’) in order to promote human rights protection.
There is a lot for human rights advocates to address here. One ques-
tion that needsto be asked is: are human rights risk strategists at work in
public health preparedness projects and, if so, in what ways? Are they,
for example, picking up on the argument made by Francis and others
96 Above n 94, at 104.
97 Above n 83, at 48. See also the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights (2000), a tripartite initiative between a range of governments, extrac-
tives companies, and NGOs (including Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch and Oxfam).
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demand attention but also the justice of pandemic planning:
The triage choices in pandemic planning for the distribution of vac-
cines and antivirals are open, coordinated, and institutionally
adopted. Perhaps this is one reason why they have drawn so
much attention. ...No doubt there are other explanations, too,
for the apparent assumption that devoting resources to pandemic
planning is just. ...Nonetheless, there are serious questions of
justice to be asked about the allocation of extensive resources to
pandemic threats.
98
And, as they go on to point out, questions concerning the ‘justice of’ and
‘justice within’ pandemic planning are not unrelated. Put shortly, if
basic health care infrastructure is in a state of neglect or unavailable,
if health professionals are in short supply or are not trusted by the popu-
lation, and if there is inequality in access to primary care, then global
surveillance, surge capacity and, more generally, preventing and
coping with a pandemic will be all the more difﬁcult. ‘Pandemic
myopia’, in other words, is a seriously ﬂawed approach to pandemic
planning
99—which is surely something that human rights advocates
(whether they see themselves as ‘risk strategists’ or not) need to be
arguing as strongly and clearly as possible.
There are other, broader questions too. These stem from the fact that
rights as risk is not home-ground for human rights advocacy. Put
bluntly, it smacks of bad faith, of working on ‘their’ terms, not on
‘ours’. Being ‘at the table’, if that course is chosen, is not likely to be
at all easy in practice. The counter-argument to this is that human
rights advocacy has always been complex.
100 Think, for example, of
the diversity of human rights advocates (such as the US Christian
Right at the United Nations using human rights to argue against
rights to sexual and reproductive health).
101 And it cannot be denied
that human rights ‘victories’ have sometimes had unexpected, negative
consequences: on occasion, they have been used by governments as a
basis from which to claim that action has been taken and no further gov-
ernmental action is required. It can also be argued that if deeper
98 LP Francis and others, ‘Pandemic Planning and Distributive Justice in Health
Care’ in M Freeman (ed), Law and Bioethics (OUP 2008) 432–50, at 433.
99 Ibid., at 446. On the need to take account of social justice in pandemic plan-
ning, especially the needs and interests of the most disadvantaged, see the
Bellagio Statement of Principles, crafted bya group of experts in 2006: avail-
able at http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/bioethics/bellagio.
100 See Whitty, Murphy and Livingstone, above n 77.
101 D Buss and D Herman, Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in
International Politics (University of Minnesota Press 2003).
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(even if primarily through the lens of risk management) is a signiﬁcant
contemporary dynamic, then human rights advocates have little
choice but to respond in some fashion. And it should not be forgotten
that risk-based indicators and compliance strategies have also been
growing areas of interest within human rights work.
102 Lastly, there
is, of course, the possibility that an organisation that starts out with
an instrumentalist mindset towards human rights might ultimately inter-
nalise them to beneﬁcial effect. Overall, then, human rights advocates
should not—and probably cannot—avoid engaging with rights as risk.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the conclusions in the report of a recent UK Parliamentary Com-
mittee on infectious diseases and global health governance is that WHO
needs additional funding ‘if it is to be able to respond effectively to
threats on behalf of the international community’.
103 This statement is
a reminder of the importance, and the fragility, of public health emer-
gency preparedness. It is likely that it will also be read, at least by
some, as a rebuke to individuals, like us, who set out to critique prepa-
redness when it is currently so precarious in practice.
Critiquing public health emergency preparedness is undeniably hard.
Who, in the end, would choose to be ‘against preparedness’—especially
when one considers the extreme human costs of recent public health
emergencies? We are not against it, however. Our argument throughout
has been that critique is essential to preparedness and that, to date, cri-
tique from a human rights perspective has been in short supply. We have
suggested a preliminary agenda to address the human rights gap, focus-
ing in particular on the frames ‘risk within rights’ and ‘rights as risk’,
and we assigned the name ‘human rights preparedness’ to the project
as a whole. We concluded by turning inwards, emphasising that this
project carries risks for human rights itself. Speciﬁcally, critiquing pre-
paredness could well involve self-critique as human rights advocacy
works towards a more differentiated analysis of how security should
be engaged and what it means to do human rights today. Putting that
another way, human rights preparedness—and, in particular, engage-
ment with ‘rights as risk’—is likely to be human rights without a
safety net.
102 See, further, T Murphy, Health and Human Rights (Hart forthcoming
2009) ch 7.
103 Above n 95, at para 114.
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